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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third 
Judicial District Court. This Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Ann. (1992), 
and pursuant to the Supreme Court' s transfer of the appeal 
pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
denying Myers' motion for leave to file amended counterclaim? 
2. Did the trial court properly dismiss Myers' 
contract and quasi-contract claims on grounds that the claims 
were barred by the real estate licensing laws and the Statute of 
Frauds? 
3. Did the trial court properly dismiss Myers' fraud 
claim on grounds that Myers presented insufficient evidence to 
satisfy his clear and convincing burden of proof? 
4. Did the trial court properly dismiss Myers' 
contract claims against MPM on grounds that the broker licensing 
statutes bar the claims and that MPM did not have an obligation, 
express or implied, to assure that Andalex compensated Myers? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. The Court reviews the district court' s order 
denying Myers leave to amend his counterclaim (issue 1 above) 
under an abuse of discretion standard. "[T]he granting of leave 
to amend is a matter which lies within the broad discretion of 
the court, and its rulings are not to be disturbed in the 
221X25392.1 
absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion resulting in 
prejudice to the complaining party. •' Girard v. Applebv, 660 
P. 2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983), See also Westley v. Farmer' s Ins. 
Exch. . 663 P. 2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983); Chadwick v. Nielsen. 763 
P. 2d 817, 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
2. In reviewing an order granting summary judgment 
(issues 2, 3 and 4 above), the Court "view[s] the facts and 
inferences in the light most favorable to the losing party," and 
reviews the district court' s legal conclusions for correctness. 
Pratt ex. rel. Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Co. . 813 P. 2d 
1169, 1171 (Utah 1991). The Court will affirm summary judgment 
if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Frisbee v. 
K&K Constr. Co. , 676 P. 2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Interpretation of the following statutory provisions 
may be determinative of some of the issues raised by this 
appeal: 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and 
subscribed. 
In the following cases every agreement shall be void 
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith: 
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent 
or broker to purchase or sell real estate for 
compens ati on. 
221X25392.1 
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Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1989). 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
Within four years: 
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or 
liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; 
also on an open account for goods, wares, and 
merchandise, and for any article charged on a store 
account; also on an open account for work, labor or 
services rendered, or materials furnished; provided, 
that action in all of the foregoing cases may be 
commenced at any time within four years after the last 
charge is made or the last payment is received. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1992). 
61-2-2. Def in i t ions . 
As used in this chapter: 
(7) "Principal real estate broker" and "principal 
broker" means: 
(a) any person who for another and for valuable 
consideration, or who with the intention or in 
the expectation or upon the promise of receiving 
or collecting valuable consideration, sells, 
exchanges, purchases, rents, or leases or 
negotiates the sale, exchange, purchase, rental, 
or leasing of, or offers or attempts or agrees to 
negotiate the sale, exchange, purchase, rental, 
or leasing of, or lists or offers or attempts or 
agrees to list, or auctions, or offers or 
attempts or agrees to collect rental for the use 
of real estate or who advertises, who buys or 
offers to buy, sells or offers to sell, or 
otherwise deals in options on real estate or the 
improvements thereon or who collects or offers or 
attempts or agrees to collect rental for the use 
of real estate or who advertises or holds 
himself, itself, or themselves out as engaged in 
the business of selling, exchanging, purchasing, 
renting, or leasing real estate, or assists or 
directs in the procuring of prospects or the 
negotiations or closing of any transaction which 
does or is calculated to result in the sale, 
exchange, leasing, or renting of any real estate; 
-3-
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(8) "Real estate" includes leaseholds and business 
opportunities involving real property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(7)-(8) (1989). 
61-2-18(1), Actions for recovery of compensation restricted. 
(1) No person may bring or maintain an action in any 
court of this state for the recovery of a commission, 
fee, or compensation for any act done or service 
rendered which is prohibited under this chapter to 
other than licensed principal brokers, unless the 
person was duly licensed as a principal broker at the 
time of the doing of the act or rendering the service. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(1) (1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This action was commenced in July, 1986 by Andalex 
Resources, Inc. and AMCA Coal Leasing, Inc. (jointly "Andalex") 
to obtain a declaratory judgment that Richard B. Myers and Myers 
& Company (jointly "Myers") are not entitled to recover from 
Andalex any fee or other compensation for allegedly acting as a 
broker in connection with Andalex' s purchase of certain coal 
leases situated within the State of Utah. x Andalex purchased 
the leases from Malapai Resources, Inc, ("Malapai"), New Albion 
Resources Company (now known as Pacific Diversified Capital 
Company) ("Pacific"), and Mono Power Company ("Mono"). In the 
Complaint, Andalex asserts that, among other things, any claim 
1
 This action was originally commenced by Andalex against 
Richard B. Myers and Myers, Inc. However, Myers & Company was 
substituted for Myers, Inc. by order of the district court. 
(Record ("R. " ) 175. ) 
-4-
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of Myers to recover any compensation is barred by the Statute of 
Frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1989), and by the real estate 
broker licensing statutes, Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(1)(1989). 
Myers counterclaimed against Andalex seeking recovery of 
compensation for his services for acting as a "finder" in 
connection with Andalex' s purchase of the coal leases, asserting 
theories of breach of contract, quantum meruit, fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation. 
Myers also filed a counterclaim against Malapai, 
Pacific and Mono. 2 In his counterclaim, Myers alleges that 
Malapai, Pacific and Mono entered into a contract which provided 
that Myers would act on behalf of Malapai, Pacific and Mono to 
find a sublessee, assignee or purchaser of the coal leases. 
Under the express terms of the contract, Malapai, Pacific and 
Mono had no obligation to compensate Myers for these services. 
Myers contends, however, that the contract contained an implied 
obligation that Malapai, Pacific and Mono would assure that any 
sublessee, assignee or purchaser of the coal lease would 
compensate Myers. Myers alleges that Malapai, Pacific and Mono 
breached the contract by failing to assure that Andalex would 
compensate Myers. Myers also alleges that Malapai, Pacific and 
1
 Myers originally filed a third-party complaint against 
Malapai, Pacific and Mono. By order of the district court, 
Malapai, Pacific and Mono were made plaintiffs in this action, 
and Myers' third-party complaint was deemed a counterclaim. (R. 
175. ) 
-5-
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Mono intentionally interfered with Myers' prospective economic 
relationship with Andalex. 
B. The Course of the Proceedings 
On February 22, 1991, the district court entered an 
order granting Andalex partial summary judgment, declaring that 
the Statute of Frauds and the broker licensing statutes 
precluded any contract or quasi-contract claims for compensation 
by Myers. The court also dismissed Myers' counterclaim against 
Andalex for breach of contract and quasi-contract. (R. 370-72.) 
On October 11, 1991, the district court denied Myers' 
motion for leave to file an amended counterclaim. (R. 476-77.) 
The proposed amended counterclaim contained a new claim against 
Andalex based upon a theory that Andalex had agreed to enter in 
a partnership with Myers regarding the coal leases. (R. 380-
86. ) 
On May 2 7, 1992, the district court entered a Summary 
Judgment and Order dismissing the remaining fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation claims against Andalex. (R. 882-84.) On the 
same date, the district court also entered a Summary Judgment 
and Order dismissing all claims against Malapai, Pacific and 
Mono. (R. 885-87. ) 
-6-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Malapai, Pacific and Mono (hereinafter jointly 
"MPM") were the joint owners of certain coal leases ("Leases") 
granted by the United States and the State of Utah. The Leases 
concern approximately 47,000 acres of real property situated in 
Kane County, Utah. (R. 130. ) 
2. Myers entered into a letter agreement dated 
May 2 3, 1979 with MPM, (Addendum, Ex. A), which provided, among 
other things, that Myers would act as a "finder" for MPM in 
locating a coal mining company to produce coal from the Leases 
or find a sublessee, assignee or purchaser of the Leases. (R. 
131*. ) Myers testified that he was to act as a "finder" on 
behalf of MPM.3 (R. 539-40.) 
3. The agreement between Myers and MPM was further 
evidenced by a letter dated May 5, 1980, (Addendum, Ex. B), a 
letter dated March 18, 1981, (Addendum, Ex. C), and a letter 
dated March 24, 1981, (Addendum, Ex. D). (R. 582-85, 542-44. ) 
Myers testified that these letters accurately reflected his 
3
 Myers contends that James Wilson, acting as an employee 
of Pacific and as an agent for Malapai and Mono, approached 
Myers in Kentucky seeking to employ Myers. (Brief of Appellants 
at 7, 1f 8. ) To support this contention, Myers cites to his 
counterclaim filed in this action. (R. 139. ) A citation to 
one' s own pleading to support a factual contention in opposition 
to a motion for summary judgment is inappropriate and the 
contention should be disregarded. Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P. 2d 
224, 226-27 (Utah 1983); Thornock v. Cook. 604 P. 2d 934, 936 
(Utah 1979); United Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Willev. 21 Utah 2d 279, 
444 P. 2d 755, 758-59 (1968). 
-7-
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understanding of the compensation arrangement between the 
parties. (R. 547-52. ) 
4. Under the arrangement between Myers and MPM, 
Myers was to be compensated by the sublessee, assignee or 
purchaser of the Leases, and not by MPM. (R. 540, 545-46, 551-
52. ) 
5. Eventually, Myers located W. R. Grace & Co. 
("Grace") and introduced Grace to MPM. (R. 131, 582-85. ) After 
some negotiations, on or about July 23, 1981, Grace and Myers 
entered into option agreements (the "Options") with Malapai and 
Pacific, whereby Malapai and Pacific granted to Grace and Myers 
an option for the acquisition of their interests in the 
Leases.4 (R. 553-55, 578, 582-85, 609.) 
6. On or about July 12, 1981 Grace and Myers entered 
into an agreement to compensate Myers, under certain terms and 
conditions, for "his efforts in bringing the parties together." 
(R. 131, 556-58.) Under this agreement, Myers would only 
receive compensation if Grace exercised the Options. (R. 654-60, 
788-815. ) 
4
 In Myers' Brief he claims that the Options were entered 
into with Pacific and Mono. (Brief of Appellants at 8, H 11.) 
However, the portion of the Record that Myers cites, (R. 213), 
states that the Options were in fact entered into with Malapai 
and Pacific, and not Mono. Myers' testimony supports the fact 
that Mono did not execute an option. (R. 553-55.) 
-8-
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7. Because of the expense, Grace was unwilling to 
exercise the Options and proceed with the acquisition of the 
Leases without a financial partner willing to share the risk. 
Additionally, Grace was unwilling to exercise the Options 
without a market for the coal. (R. 661-70, 702-03, 708-10, 715-
20. ) 
8. Grace allowed the Options to expire in August 
1982. However, Myers contends that he had an informal 
arrangement with Malapai and Pacific that, notwithstanding the 
expiration of the Options, they would transfer their interest in 
the Leases to Grace if it elected to proceed. (R. 669-70, 702-
03, 708-10.) According to Myers, for this reason, he continued 
to look for a company which was capable and willing to enter a 
joint venture with Grace. (R. 702-04. ) 
9. Myers eventually contacted Andalex in 
approximately September 1982, and arranged for negotiations 
between Grace and Andalex regarding a joint venture for the 
development of the Leases. (R. 131, 610, 582-85, 702-07, 712-
714. ) 
10. Discussions between Grace and Andalex continued 
into 1984. (R. 613-17.) Eventually, Grace determined not to go 
forward with the purchase and development of the Leases. (R. 
131-32, 582-85, 613-17, 651-52. ) 
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11. Andalex, however, was still interested in 
purchasing the Leases and commenced negotiations directly with 
MPM. According to Myers, he arranged and attended some of the 
meetings between those parties. (R. 132, 582-85, 722-25. ) 
12. The agreement between Myers and MPM did not 
prohibit MPM from negotiating directly with potential 
sublessees, assignees or purchasers. (R. 561-63, 597. ) 
13. At a meeting on March 28, 1985 between MPM and 
Andalex, in the presence of Myers and his attorney, Andalex made 
clear its understanding and intention that it had no agreement 
to compensate Myers. Myers made no claim to the contrary at the 
meeting. (R. 672-76, 727-33, 783-87, 816-18. ) 
14. On or about September 10, 1985, Andalex entered 
into an agreement with MPM to purchase the Leases. (R. 132, 
582-85. ) 
15. Myers alleges that Andalex agreed to compensate 
Myers by assuming the position of Grace under the July 12, 1981 
agreement between Grace and Myers. (R. 133, 383. ) There is no 
written document or memorandum signed by Andalex evidencing this 
purported agreement between Andalex and Myers. (R. 586-87.) 
16. Myers believes that Robert Anderson, the 
President of Andalex and the only officer of Andalex with whom 
Myers had any dealings concerning compensation, was honest in 
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his dealing with Myers and was not attempting to deceive Myers. 
(R. 876-78.) Myers specifically testified as follows: 
Q. Do you know of any other facts that lead 
you to believe that Mr. Anderson intended to 
deceive or mislead you concerning 
compensation to you regarding the work you 
performed in connection with the Kaiparowits 
leases? 
A. I think the only thing that they did 
that was deceiving to us was to go around 
Grace prior to telling us that they were 
going to do it. I don' t think Mr. Anderson 
was attempting to deceive us. He was just 
like he always was, straight upfront. 
(R. 877-78. ) 
17. Myers has no knowledge of any facts that support 
the claim that Andalex was not acting in good faith in 
negotiating with Grace. Myers testified as follows: 
Q. Do you know of any facts that lead you 
to believe that Mr. Anderson or anyone from 
Andalex did not enter into discussions with 
Grace in good faith? 
A. I don' t know what their thinking was; 
therefore, my answer is no. 
(R. 878. ) 
18. Each officer of Andalex involved with the 
purchase of the Leases has testified that nothing that MPM did 
or did not do caused Andalex to refuse to enter into a contract 
with Myers or to compensate Myers. (R. 529, 569-71, 675-76. ) 
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19. Myers has no knowledge of any instance where MPM 
in anyway interfered with Andalex compensating Myers. (R. 564-
65. ) 
20. Myers has no knowledge of any intentional act of 
MPM made to cause harm to Myers. (R. 565. ) 
21. Myers holds no license in Utah or Kentucky to act 
as a real estate broker. (R. 275-76, 595. ) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Myers argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying his motion for leave to file an amended 
counterclaim, even though the motion was made almost five years 
after the case was initiated. As will be shown below, the 
district court properly denied this motion because the proposed 
new claim was legally insufficient -- it was barred by the 
statute of limitations, the real estate broker licensing laws, 
and the Statute of Frauds. Moreover, the claim was properly 
denied because Myers was unduly dilatory in seeking leave to 
amend the counterclaim. 
Myers also contends that the trial court improperly 
dismissed his contract and quasi-contract claims against 
Andalex. Myers suggests that although the real estate licensing 
laws on their face clearly bar his claim, they should not apply 
because Myers' conduct does not fall within the "purpose" of the 
licensing requirements. This Court has previously expressly 
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rejected this type of argument and should do so again here. In 
addition, the court properly found that these claims were barred 
by the Statute of Frauds. 
Myers suggests that the trial court should not have 
dismissed his fraud claim against Andalex, even though Myers' 
own testimony established that Andalex did not have the 
requisite intent to deceive. We will show, among other things, 
that because Myers was unable to satisfy his burden of "clear 
and convincing" proof on this essential element, summary 
judgment was properly granted. 
Finally, Myers argues that his contract claims against 
MPM should not have been dismissed. As will be shown below, 
however, the trial court properly concluded that the broker 
licensing statutes barred this claim and that MPM had no 
obligation, express or implied, to assure that Andalex 
compensated Myers. 
As set forth more fully below, the judgment of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM 
On May 23, 1991, almost five years after the case was 
initiated, Myers filed a motion for leave to file an amended 
counterclaim against Andalex. In the proposed amended 
counterclaim, Myers asserted a new cause of action against 
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Andalex based upon an alleged agreement that Andalex would enter 
into a partnership or joint venture with Myers. (R. 380-83.) 
The original counterclaim sought recovery of compensation 
allegedly owing to Myers for acting as a "finder" in connection 
with Andalex' s purchase of the Leases. (R. 380-83. ) 
The motion for leave to file an amended counterclaim 
was properly denied by the district court on any of a number of 
grounds before the district court including (1) the new 
partnership claim was barred by the statute of limitations, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1992); (2) the claim was barred by the 
real estate broker licensing laws, Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-
18(1)(1989); (3) the claim was barred by the Statute of Frauds, 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1989); and (4) Myers had been unduly 
dilatory in seeking leave to amend the counterclaim. 5 
A. Standard of Review 
The Court reviews the district court' s order denying 
Myers leave to amend his counterclaim under an abuse of 
An appellate court will sustain a lower court decision 
on any proper grounds. Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P. 2d 326, 
328 (Utah 1980); Baashaw v. Baashaw, 788 P. 2d 1057, 1060 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990); Arizona Bd. of Regents v. States ex. rel. State 
of Ariz. Pub. Safety Retirement Fund Manager Adm' r, 771 P.2d 
880, 884 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); LaMon v. Butler. 770 P. 2d 1027, 
1031 (Wash.), cert, denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989). Accordingly, 
if any one of the various grounds for denying the motion is 
found by this Court to be meritorious, or not an abuse of 
discretion by the district court, as applicable, then the order 
denying the motion for leave should be sustained. 
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discretion standard. " [T]he granting of leave to amend is a 
matter which lies within the broad discretion of the court, and 
its rulings are not to be disturbed in the absence of a showing 
of an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the 
complaining party. " Girard v. Appleby. 660 P. 2d 245, 248 (Utah 
1983). See also Westlev v. Farmed s Ins. Exch. . 663 P. 2d 93, 94 
(Utah 1983); Chadwick v. Nielsen. 763 P. 2d 817, 820 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
B. The Proposed Partnership Claim is Barred by the 
Applicable Statute of Limitations 
It is fundamental that leave to file an amended 
pleading should be denied when the moving party seeks leave to 
assert a new claim that is frivolous or legally insufficient. 
E. a. , Black Canvon Racauetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat' 1 
Bank. N. A. , 804 P. 2d 900, 904 (Idaho 1991); Conrad v. Imatani, 
724 P. 2d 89, 94 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986). Thus, a motion for leave 
to file an amended complaint should be denied when a new claim 
is asserted that is barred by a statute of limitations. Oliner 
v. McBride' s Indus. . Inc. . 106 F. R. D. 9, 12 (S. D. N. Y. 1985); 
Cooper v. Thomas, 456 So. 2d 280, 283 (Ala. 1984). 
In this instance, Myers7 new claim of breach of an 
oral contract to enter into a partnership agreement is barred by 
the limitation contained in section 78-12-25 of the Utah Code 
which provides that an action on an oral contract must be 
commenced within four years. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(1) 
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(1992); Last Chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 82 Utah 475, 25 P. 2d 
952, 958 (1933). The alleged breach by Andalex occurred by no 
later than September 1985, when Andalex acquired the Leases. 
The limitation period began to run at that time. Last Chance 
Ranch, 25 P. 2d at 958; Butcher v. Gilrov. 744 P. 2d 311, 313 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). To avoid the bar, Myers' new claim had to 
be filed no later than September 1989. It was not. The motion 
for leave to file the amended counterclaim was not filed until 
May 23, 1991, approximately 18 months beyond the statutory 
period. 
Myers can only avoid the application of the statute of 
limitations if his new claim relates back to the date of filing 
the original counterclaim, as provided in Rule 15(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 For a new claim to relate back 
under Rule 15(c), it must arise out of the same conduct, 
transaction or occurrence set forth in the original pleading. 
Norman v. Nichiro GyogYQ Kaisha. Ltd. . 645 P. 2d 191, 198 (Alaska 
1982) (amendment relates back if based on "same specific 
Rule 15(c) provides: 
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in 
the amended pleading arose out of the 
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 
forth or attempted to be set forth in the 
original pleading, the amendment relates 
back to the date of the original pleading. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15 (c). 
221X25392.1 
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conduct" ), overruled in part on other grounds, Hikita v. Nichico 
Gyogvo Kaisha, Ltd. . 713 P. 2d 1197 (Alaska 1986); Mever v. Ford 
Indus. , Inc. , 622 P. 2d 1139, 1141 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (amendment 
relates back if based on the same conduct). An amendment which 
merely amplifies or clarifies a prior pleading will relate back. 
Oliner, 106 F. R. D. at 12; Cooper, 456 So. 2d at 283-84. 
Generally, a new cause of action asserted by way of amendment 
will relate back if the defending party should have known from 
the original pleading the new facts and new claim based on those 
facts alleged in the amended pleading. E. g. . Percy v. San 
Francisco Gen. Host*. . 841 F. 2d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 1988); cf. 
Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc. , 786 P. 2d 1350, 1359-60 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 795 P. 2d 1138 (Utah 1990); 
Augusta Bank & Trust v. Broomfield, 643 P. 2d 100, 105 (Kan. 
1982); 6A Charles A. Wright et al. , Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1497, at 85 (2d ed. 1990). 
However, when an amended pleading asserts a new cause 
of action based on new or additional conduct, transactions or 
occurrences, the amendment does not relate back. Holmes v. 
Greyhound Lines. Inc. . 757 F. 2d 1563, 1566 (5th Cir. 1985). In 
Welch v. Continental Placement, Inc. , 627 S. W. 2d 319 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1982), the court held: "If the amended pleading, however, 
requires proof of ultimate facts different from those necessary 
to sustain the original claim and thus adds a new cause of 
action, the amendment does not relate back so as to save the 
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action from the bar of limitations." 627 S. W. 2d at 321. See 
also Dillard v. Vicksbura Medical Ctr. , Inc. . 695 F. Supp. 880, 
883 (S. D. Miss. 1988). 7 
In this case, Myers originally sought to recover 
compensation for acting as a finder in connection with Andalex' s 
acquisition of the Leases. By the amended counterclaim, Myers 
set forth a new cause of action based upon an alleged agreement 
that Andalex would enter into a partnership or joint venture 
with Myers. (Brief of Appellants at 12-13.) The two agreements 
are different and distinct, and therefore will require different 
elements of proof.8 Moreover, there was no notice to Andalex 
7
 For other cases, see Graboi v. Kibel. 432 F. Supp. 572 
(S. D. N. Y. 1977) (rape victim's claim of inadequate security did 
not relate back to claims against building owner based on 
vicarious liability for the intentional tort of the employee and 
breach of contract); Kimbrel v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. , 476 
So. 2d 94, 96 (Ala. 1985) (claim of fraud in connection with a 
sale did not relate back to other claims concerning sale); Wing 
v. Martin, 688 P. 2d 1172, 1175 (Idaho 1984) (claim of failure to 
warn and properly label a product did not relate back to claim 
of failure to prevent misuse of product). 
8
 Counsel for Myers recognizes that the partnership 
claim would involve proof of facts different from those 
necessary to sustain the original claims against Andalex. 
Counsel stated to the district court when requesting leave to 
amend: "May we have leave to amend, Your Honor, to specifically 
get the Shire facts before the court?" (R. 932. ) (The decision 
of Shire Develop, v. Frontier Invs. . 799 P. 2d 221 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) is the case relied upon by Myers to support his 
partnership claim against Andalex. ) 
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of the partnership claim contained in the original 
counterclaim. 9 
The claim does not relate back to the original claim 
and is therefore barred by the statute of limitations. The 
district court properly denied Myers' motion for leave to file 
the amended counterclaim. 
C. The Proposed Partnership Claim is 
Barred by the Statute of Frauds and the 
Broker Licensing Laws 
Regardless of whether the partnership claim is a new 
and distinct claim or merely a reformulation of Myers' original 
claim, it is still a claim to compensate Myers for acting as a 
broker. The claim, therefore, is barred by the Statute of 
Frauds and the broker licensing statutes. The new cause of 
9Rinawood v. Foreign Auto Works. Inc. . 786 P. 2d 1350 (Utah 
Ct. App. ), cert, denied. 795 P. 2d 1138 (Utah 1990), relied upon 
heavily by Myers, is not controlling. In Rinawood, the Court, 
under an abuse of discretion standard, affirmed the district 
court' s order permitting amendment of a plaintiff s pleading. 
The Court focused largely upon whether the defendants who 
opposed the amendment were aware of the basis for the amended 
claim prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. 
The court noted that the amended claim conformed with a position 
argued by the defendants themselves, before the statute of 
limitations had run. Initially, the plaintiff had argued that 
certain agreements were controlling, while the defendants had 
argued that a different agreement was controlling. When the 
plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to base his claims on 
the agreement defendants argued controlled, the Court found no 
prejudice to the defendants. 1&. at 1360. In the instant case, 
there was no claim of a partnership or partnership agreement 
prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations and motion 
for amended counterclaim, nor have Andalex or MPM ever made such 
a claim. 
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action is based upon a breach of an alleged agreement by Andalex 
to enter into a partnership with Myers. Myers contends that 
Andalex agreed to assume the position of Grace under the July 
12, 1981 agreement between Grace and Myers. Presumably to avoid 
application of the Statute of Frauds and the broker licensing 
statutes, Myers does not claim that the agreement allegedly 
assumed by Andalex was to compensate Myers for acting as a 
finder. However, the agreement between Grace and Myers that 
Andalex allegedly assumed recites that it was to compensate 
Myers for "his efforts in bringing the parties together." (R. 
131; see also 556-58. )10 
Regardless of how the alleged agreement between 
Andalex and Myers is now characterized, it is still an agreement 
to compensate Myers for acting as a finder. Accordingly, to 
enforce the agreement, Myers must show that the agreement 
satisfies the provisions of Utah' s Statute of Frauds and the 
broker licensing laws. Myers made no such showing. 
Myers was not a licensed real estate broker. He is 
therefore precluded from maintaining an action for compensation 
for acting as a broker by reason of section 61-2-18(1) of the 
10
 Myers describes the agreement as an agreement to 
compensate Myers "for his efforts in introducing Grace to the 
opportunities presented by the coal leases." (Brief of 
Appellants at 12. ) In both the original counterclaim and the 
proposed amended counterclaim, Myers describes the agreement as 
providing "for certain compensation for Mr. Myers as a result of 
his efforts in bringing the parties together. " (Brief of 
Appellants at 15. ) 
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Utah Code. n See infra part II. B. Furthermore, because there 
was no writing reflecting the alleged agreement between Andalex 
and Myers regarding compensation, Myers' claim for compensation 
is barred by the Statute of Frauds. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 
(1989). 12 
As noted above, a motion for leave to file an amended 
pleading should be denied if the amended pleading fails to state 
a claim. See supra p. 15. The proposed partnership claim 
asserted by Myers is without merit because it is barred by both 
the Statute of Frauds and the broker licensing laws. The 
Section 61-2-18(1) provides: 
No person may bring or maintain an action in 
any court of this state for the recovery of 
a commission, fee, or compensation for any 
act done or service rendered which is 
prohibited under this chapter to other than 
licensed principal brokers. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(1) (1989). 
Section 25-5-4 provides: 
In the following cases every agreement shall 
be void unless such agreement ... is in 
writing subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith: ... (5) Every agreement 
authorizing or employing an agent or broker 
to purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1989). The current version 
of Section 25-5-4(5) remains substantially unchanged. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(5) (Supp. 1992). 
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district court properly denied Myers' motion for leave to assert 
this meritless claim. 
D. Myers Was Unduly Dilatory in Seeking to File the 
Amended Counterclaim 
A motion to amend should be denied if the party 
seeking the amendment has been unduly dilatory. Wood v. Santa 
Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc. , 705 F. 2d 1515, 1520 (9th Cir. 
1983), cert, denied. 465 U.S. 1081 (1984); see also Lindev' s. 
Inc. v. Professional Consultants, Inc. , 797 P. 2d 920, 923 (Mont. 
1990) (quoting Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962)). When 
a considerable amount of time has elapsed since the commencement 
of the action, a party seeking leave to amend bears the burden 
of showing some adequate reason for the delay. See Tripp v. 
Vauahn, 746 P. 2d 794, 797 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (court did not 
abuse discretion in denying motion to amend where plaintiff was 
unable to state adequate reason for delay and opposing party 
claimed p r e j u d i c e ) ; 53? frlgQ Fefler^l Ins ? QQ, VT Qfrteg L^^yj^t 
Corp. , 823 F. 2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1987) ("Courts have denied 
leave to amend in situations where the moving party cannot 
demonstrate excusable neglect. For example, courts have denied 
leave to amend where the moving party was aware of the facts on 
which the amendment was based for some time prior to the filing 
of the motion to amend."); Hayes v. New England Mi11work 
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Distribs. . Inc. . 602 F. 2d 15, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1979) (party must 
show valid reason for neglect and delay).13 
In this case, Myers has no reasonable excuse for the 
delay. This action was commenced in July, 1986. The original 
counterclaim was filed on or about July 22, 1988. When Myers 
finally filed his motion for leave, it had been five years since 
this action was commenced and three years since the original 
counterclaim was filed. Myers' only explanation for his delay 
in seeking an amendment is that the legal basis for the claim 
was only recently settled in the Utah courts by the decision in 
Shire Development v. Frontier Investments. 799 P. 2d 221 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). This explanation does not withstand scrutiny. 
The Shire decision did not clarify or address a new or 
unique area of the law. In fact, the Shire court decided the 
issue relating to oral partnerships with reference to a 1974 
Arizona case, Ellingson v. Sloan. 527 P. 2d 1100 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
13Myers cites Regional Sales Agency. Inc. v. Reichert. 784 
P. 2d 1210 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), vacated. 830 P. 2d 252 (Utah 
1992). That opinion has been vacated and is not good law. Even 
if that decision were good law, the decision supports the 
district court' s denial of leave to amend. The court in 
Regional Sales observed: 
Appellate courts have upheld a trial court' s 
denial of a motion to amend where the 
amendment is sought late in the course of 
the litigation, where there is no adequate 
explanation for the delay, and where the 
movant was aware of the facts underlying the 
proposed amendment long before its filing. 
Id. at 1216. Those very considerations are present in the 
instant case. 
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1974), which in turn relied on a 1925 decision, Eads v. Murphy, 
232 P. 877 (Ariz. 1925). £££ 799 P. 2d at 223. Contrary to 
Myers' assertion, the issue was not "unique," and did not 
justify the delay in seeking the amendment. 14 As noted in 
Hayes v. New England Millwork Distributors. Inc. . 602 F. 2d 15 
(1st Cir. 1979), "ignorance or misunderstanding of the law 'has 
been held an insufficient basis for leave to amend. ' " Id. at 20 
(quoting Goss v. Revlon, Inc. , 548 F. 2d 405, 407 (2d Cir. 
1976)). See also Evans v. Syracuse City School Dist. . 704 F. 2d 
44, 47 (2d Cir. 1983). 
Myers admits that he has known of the facts and 
circumstances that give rise to the partnership claim from the 
initiation of the litigation in 1986. (Brief of Appellants at 
15; R. 377. ) An unreasonable delay in seeking amendment after 
knowledge of the pertinent facts justifies denial of motion to 
amend. See Westley v. Farmer' s Ins. Exch. . 663 P. 2d 93, 94 
(Utah 1983) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying motion to 
amend where amendment would have delayed trial and substance of 
allegation was known a full year earlier); Gates Leariet Corp. . 
823 F. 2d at 387; fif. Chadwick v. Nielsen. 763 P. 2d 817, 820 
14Significantly, the Court in Shire cited the Arizona cases 
and the oral partnership issue in explaining its holding in 
Shire and not in support of its establishing "new" law in Utah. 
See 799 P. 2d at 223-24. 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (untimely motion denied where only excuse 
was failure to to conduct discovery).15 
Myers was unreasonably dilatory in bringing the motion 
for leave to file the amended counterclaim. The district court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying Myers' untimely motion 
to amend. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED MYERS' CONTRACT 
AND QUASI-CONTRACT CLAIMS 
A. Standard of Review16 
In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, the 
Court nview[s] the facts and inferences in the light most 
favorable to the losing party," and reviews the district court' s 
legal conclusions for correctness. Pratt ex rel. Pratt v. 
Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Co. , 813 P. 2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991). 
The Court will consider only the record properly before the 
district court. I£. 
15
 Myers argues that Andalex has not sustained any 
prejudice to justify denial of his motion. To the contrary. If 
the district court had allowed Myers to assert the new 
partnership claim, Andalex would have been required to redepose 
witnesses and propound additional written discovery. This type 
of prejudice justifies denial of the motion. E. a. , Hayes, 602 
F. 2d at 20; cf. Evans v. Syracuse City School Dist. . 704 F. 2d 
44, 46 (2d Cir. 1983) (delay for significant period of time in 
asserting affirmative defense almost invariably results in some 
prejudice) (quoting Advocat v. Nexus Indus. . Inc. , 497 F. Supp. 
328, 331 (D. Del. 1980)). 
16The Standard of Review set forth herein governs Points 
II, III and IV below. 
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The Court will affirm summary judgment if there are no 
genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Frisbee v. K&K Constr. 
Co. , 676 P. 2d 387, 389 (Utah 1984). To defeat a summary 
judgment motion, the opposing party must demonstrate facts 
supporting each element of its claims. The "non-moving party's 
failure of proof concerning one essential element of that 
party7 s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. " 
Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical. Inc. . 764 P. 2d 636, 642 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317 
(1986)). Furthermore, "in ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through the 
prism of the substantive evidentiary burden. " Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby. Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986); accord Robinson 
v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc. , 740 P. 2d 262, 264 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). 
B, Myers Cannot Maintain an Action on the Contract 
and Quasi-Contract Claims by Reason of the Real 
Estate Licensing Laws 
The district court held that Myers' contract and 
quasi-contract claims were barred by the broker licensing 
statutes. 17 (R. 370-72. ) There were no issues of material 
17
 Myers states that the basis for the district court' s 
decision was not clearly articulated. (Brief of Appellants at 
20. ) There can be no question that the district court found 
that both the broker licensing statutes and the Statute of 
Frauds precluded Myers' contract and quasi-contract claims. The 
Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, (R. 370-72), granted 
judgment on the second and third causes of action of the 
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fact and the ruling of the district court was correct as a 
matter of law. 18 
An unlicensed person may not bring or maintain an 
action in Utah for the recovery of compensation for services 
performed which are only authorized to be performed by a 
licensed real estate broker. The pertinent statutory provisions 
are contained in title 61, chapter 2, of the Utah Code. Section 
61-2-18(1) provides: 
No person may bring or maintain an action in 
any court of this state for the recovery of 
a commission, fee, or compensation for any 
act done or service rendered which is 
prohibited under this chapter to other than 
licensed principal brokers, unless the 
person was duly licensed as a principal 
broker at the time of the doing of the act 
or rendering the service. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-18(1) (1989). Section 61-2-2(7)(a) 
defines "principal broker" as follows: 
Complaint which sought a declaratory judgment that Myers' claims 
against Andalex were barred by the Statute of Frauds and the 
broker licensing statutes. The Order also granted summary 
judgment on the first and second causes of action of the 
counterclaim, which were Myers' contract and quasi-contract 
claims against Andalex. Regardless, the Court may affirm on any 
basis supported by the record. See supra note 5. 
18
 Myers states that Andalex conceded Myers' version of 
the facts in connection with the motion because Andalex failed 
to respond in its reply memorandum to Myers' factual 
contentions. (Brief of Appellants at 20. ) This statement is 
not correct. In fact, in its reply memorandum, Andalex 
addressed many of Myers' factual assertions, and demonstrated 
that those assertions were insufficient to deny the motion for 
summary judgment. (E. g. . R. 354, 358-60. ) The remainder of 
Myers' factual assertions were deemed sufficiently immaterial to 
merit a specific response. 
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[A]ny person who for another and for 
valuable consideration, or who with the 
intention or in the expectation or upon the 
promise of receiving or collecting valuable 
consideration, sells, exchanges, purchases, 
rents or leases, . . . or assists or directs 
in the procuring of prospects or the 
negotiation or closing of any transaction 
which does or is calculated to result in the 
sale, exchange, leasing or renting of any 
real estate. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(7)(a) (1989) (emphasis added).19 
Section 61-2-2(8) defines "real estate" to include leaseholds 
and business opportunities involving real property. Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-2-2(8) (1989). 20 See also Chase v. Morgan, 9 Utah 2d 
125, 339 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1959) (holding that an oil and gas 
lease was real estate for purposes of the broker licensing 
provisions). 
The services allegedly provided by Myers fall within 
the provisions of section 61-2-2(7). In Diversified General 
Corp. v. White Barn Golf Course, Inc. , 584 P. 2d 848 (Utah 1978), 
the plaintiff argued he did not need to be a licensed broker to 
recover a finder' s fee because his duties under the contract 
were merely to find or locate a prospective buyer, and nothing 
more. Id. at 849-50. The Utah Supreme Court rejected 
plaintiff s argument and held that the plaintiff s actions fell 
19Section 61-2-2 was amended in 1991. The substance of the 
definition of "principal broker" remains the same. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-2-2(9)(d) (Supp. 1992). 
20Section 61-2-2 was amended in 1991 and the definition of 
real estate is now found in section 61-2-2(10). See Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-2-2(10) (Supp. 1992). 
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within the statutory definition of a broker. In reaching its 
decision, the Court cited with approval Corson v. Keane, 72 A. 2d 
314 (N.J. 1950). In Corson, the plaintiff argued that he need 
not be licensed because his duties were merely to bring the 
buyer and seller together. The Corson court dismissed the 
argument, noting: 
If the statute does not apply to such a 
situation, then it is a toothless 
enactment . . . . In short, every 
unlicensed broker will be enabled to carry 
on his business just as he did before the 
statute came into existence, simply by 
calling himself a finder, an originator, an 
introducer, instead of a broker. 
Corson, 72 A. 2d at 316 (citing Baird v. Krancer, 246 N. Y. S. 85, 
88 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1930); Diversified Gen. . 584 P. 2d at 851 
(quoting Corson). 21 
Myers argues that he was not a "principal broker," as 
defined by section 61-2-2(7), because the services he provided 
were not of a nature contemplated by the "purpose" of the 
licensing requirements for principal brokers. n To accept 
Myers' argument requires the Court to ignore the clear and 
21
 Recovery by a plaintiff on a claim that is barred by 
reason of section 61-2-18, of the Utah Code, is not permitted 
based on a theory of quantum meruit. Baugh v. Parley. 112 Utah 
1, 184 P. 2d 335, 339 (1947); accord. Watts v. Andrews, 649 P. 2d 
472, 474 (N. M. 1982). 
22Myers contends that the purpose of the licensing 
provisions is to protect the public from unscrupulous real 
estate brokers and to insure honesty and integrity. Incredibly, 
Myers seems to suggest that the services he provided did not 
require honesty and integrity and therefore the services do not 
fall within the purpose of the statute. 
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unambiguous terms of sections 61-2-18(1) and 61-2-2(7). Myers 
argues that the purpose of the statute prevail over literal, 
technical interpretations. He fails to recognize, however, that 
the best evidence of a statute' s purpose is the language of the 
statute. E. a. , Janson ex rel. Janson v. Christensen, 808 P. 2d 
1222, 1223 (Ariz. 1991). Because the language is the best 
evidence of meaning, courts will only consider matters extrinsic 
to the language of a statute when there is some ambiguity or 
uncertainty as to the statute' s meaning or application. This 
issue was directly addressed by this Court in Cox Rock Products 
v. Walker Pipeline Construction, 754 P. 2d 672 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). The Court stated: 
[T]here exists no ambiguous language or 
inconsistency which the court must interpret 
or construe to explain its exact meaning. 
'We will interpret and apply [a] statute 
according to its literal wording unless it 
is unreasonably confused or inoperable. ' 
Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. R. 
Co. . 749 P. 2d 660, 672 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Since the language is clear, and only 
one meaning can be derived from an express 
exclusion, it is not appropriate to look to 
legislative history. ' There is nothing to 
construe where there is no ambiguity in the 
statute. ' State v. Archuletta, 526 P. 2d 
911, 912 (Utah 1974). S^e Mountain States 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm' n. 107 
Utah 502, 505, 155 P. 2d 184, 185 (Utah 1945) 
(statutory interpretation ' must be based on 
the language used, . . . and the court has 
no power to rewrite a statute to make it 
conform to an intention not expressed' ). 
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754 P.2d at 676. See also Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. 
Cardtano, 610 P. 2d 334, 337 (Utah 1980); Cannon v. Gardner, 611 
P.2d 1207, 1208-09 (Utah 1980). 
In any event, the services provided by Myers do fall 
within the purpose of the licensing statutes. Those statutes 
clearly apply to "finders." Diversified Gen. . 584 P. 2d at 851. 
Since the legislature intended the licensing requirements to 
apply to "finders," then the legislature must have intended the 
purpose of the statute (i.e., protection of the public) to apply 
to finders and parties dealing with finders. Thus, even though 
Myers may have only been acting as a "finder," the purpose of 
the statute still applies. Furthermore, contrary to Myers' 
contention,23 corporate plaintiffs, including Andalex, are 
entitled to the protection of the statute, regardless of their 
s ophi s t i cat i on. 
Myers seems to argue that because his compensation for 
acting as a finder was a partnership interest with Andalex, he 
was not acting as a broker. This argument ignores the express 
language of the statute. The term "principal broker" is not 
defined by the method of compensation, but, rather, by 
consideration of the acts performed and whether the broker had 
an "expectation" of receiving "valuable consideration." See 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(7)(a) (1989). 
See Brief of Appellants at 21. 
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In this case, Myers was to receive "valuable 
consideration," i.e., the alleged partnership interest, as 
compensation for bringing the parties together. 24 Clearly, 
Myers was acting as a "principal broker" within the meaning of 
Utah's broker licensing statute, and he was required to be 
licensed. 25 Because he was not, the trial court properly 
dismissed Myers' contract and quasi-contract claims. 
C. The Contract and Quasi-Contract Claims of Myers 
Against Andalex are Barred by the Statute of 
Frauds 
The district court also found that Myers' contract and 
quasi-contract claims were barred by the Statute of Frauds. 26 
L
 See supra note 10 (describing the purpose of the 
Grace/Myers agreement which Andalex allegedly assumed). 
25
 The Court should also note that Myers has provided no 
support for his contention that indeed there was an agreement 
between Myers and Andalex. Myers makes this factual conclusion 
in Brief of Appellants at 9, U 17. To support the contention, 
Myers cites pages 213-14 of the Record, at which Andalex's 
Memorandum in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment is 
found. Presumably, Myers is citing to paragraph 11 of Andalex's 
Statement of Facts, which recites Myers' contention based upon 
his allegations contained in his counterclaim. It does not 
support the "facts" asserted by Myers in his Brief. 
Furthermore, a citation to one' s own pleading to support a 
factual contention in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment, which is what in effect Myers has done, is 
inappropriate and the contention should be disregarded. Hall v. 
Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224, 226-27 (Utah 1983); Thornock v. Cook. 
604 P. 2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979); United Am. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Willev. 21 Utah 2d 279, 444 P. 2d 755, 758-59 (1968). 
26
 Myers claims that the district court did not state its 
grounds for granting summary judgment. (Brief of Appellants at 
22) As noted earlier, there is no question that the district 
court found that both the Statute of Frauds and the broker 
licensing statutes precluded Myers' contract and quasi-contract 
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(R. 370-72.) There were no issues of material fact and the 
ruling of the district court was correct as a matter of law. 27 
Under the Utah Statute of Frauds, Utah Code Ann. § 25-
5-4(5) (1989),28 every agreement authorizing or employing an 
agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate29 for 
claims. See supra note 17. In any event, this Court may affirm 
on any basis supported by the record. See supra note 5. 
27
 Myers has not made a proper citation to the record to 
support his contention that there was any agreement between him 
and Andalex. See supra note 25. 
l
* Section 25-5-4 provides: 
In the following cases, every agreement 
shall be void unless such agreement, or some 
note or memorandum of the agreement, is in 
writing subscribed by the party to be 
charged with the agreement: 
(5) Every agreement authorizing or 
employing an agent or broker to 
purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (1989). The relevant portion of the 
current version of section 25-5-4 remains substantially the 
same. See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (Supp. 1992). 
29
 The subject Leases are "real estate" for purposes of 
the Statute of Frauds. The term "real estate" is not defined in 
section 25-5-4. However, the term is defined in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 68-3-12 (1986) which sets forth various definitions to be used 
in construing the statutes of the State of Utah. Section 68-3-
12(10) defines "real estate" to "include land, tenements, 
hereditaments, water rights, possessory rights, and claims. " 
See also Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-12(2)(h) (Supp. 1992) (current 
version of former § 68-3-12(10)). See also Utah Code Ann. § 57-
1-1(3) (Supp. 1992); Chase v. Morgan. 9 Utah 2d 125, 339 P.2d 
1019, 1021 (1959) (holding that an oil and gas lease was real 
estate under the broker licensing statute). 
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compensation must be in a writing signed by the party to be 
charged with the agreement. The Statute of Frauds "applies 
broadly to agreements requiring compensation for brokering real 
estate, including finder' s agreements, and not just to contracts 
employing brokers to purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation. " Machan Hampshire Properties, Inc. v. Western 
Real Estate & Dev. Co. . 779 P. 2d 230, 234 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
See also C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willev. 758 P. 2d 923, 927 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
Furthermore, the Statute of Frauds applies to 
agreements for compensation when the agent' s or broker' s duties 
are merely to introduce or provide names of prospective 
purchasers, as Myers claims his duties were in this case. In 
C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willev, 758 P. 2d 923 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
the plaintiff argued that its contract was merely an agreement 
for a "finder's fee," and that his duties were only to furnish a 
list of prospective purchasers. £d. at 925 & n. 1. The 
plaintiff claimed that because of the limited nature of his 
duties, the statutes governing real estate brokers, including 
the Statute of Frauds, were inapplicable. The Court 
specifically held that the Statute of Frauds was applicable to 
the plaintiff s agreement. III. at 927; see also Diversified 
Gen. , 584 P. 2d at 234 (Statute of Frauds applies to finder's 
agreement); Machan Hampshire, 779 P. 2d at 234. 
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According to Myers, he was to act as a "finder" on 
behalf of MPM and was to be compensated for his alleged services 
in connection with Andalex' s purchase of the Leases. (R. 539-
40. ) This is clearly an agreement subject to the Statute of 
Frauds. Since there is no written document signed by Andalex 
which evinces the alleged agreement, such agreement, if one 
existed at all, is void and unenforceable. 30 
III. MYERS' CLAIM OF FRAUD AGAINST ANDALEX WAS PROPERLY 
DISMISSED BECAUSE OF A LACK OF EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT 
Myers appeals the district court' s order dismissing 
his counterclaim31 alleging that Andalex fraudulently 
represented that it would compensate him in accordance with the 
30
 Myers' claim of quantum meruit is likewise barred. A 
claim based on an oral contract barred by Section 25-5-4(5), 
cannot be used as a basis for recovery on a theory of quantum 
meruit. Bauah v. Parley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P. 2d 335, 339-340 
(1947); see also. C.C. Marvel, Annotation, Real-estate Broker' s 
Right to Recover in Quantum Meruit for Services Although 
Contract is Not in Writing as Required by Statute, 41 A. L. R. 2d 
905, 906 (1955). 
31The district court also dismissed Myers' claim that 
Andalex misrepresented that it intended to enter into a joint 
venture agreement with Grace for the purpose of producing coal 
from the leases. (R. 133. ) No discussion of this issue appears 
in Myers' Brief; we therefore assume Myers has also conceded 
this point. 
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terms of his agreement with Grace. The elements of an action 
for fraudulent misrepresentation are: 
(1) a representation; (2) concerning a 
presently existing material fact; (3) which 
was false; (4) which the representor 
either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; 
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably 
and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in 
fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby 
induced to act; (9) to his injury and 
damage. 
Duaan v. Jones, 615 P. 2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980). See also 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch. , 817 P. 2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991). 
In resisting this motion for summary judgment, Myers, 
who has the burden of proof on this fraud claim, must come forth 
with proof in order to avoid summary judgment. Reeves v. Geiay 
Pharmaceutical, Inc. , 764 P. 2d 636, 642 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)). Myers 
must prove each element of his fraud claim, including 
intentional misrepresentation, with clear and convincing 
evidence. See Crookston. 817 P. 2d at 800; Territorial Sav. & 
Loan Ass/ n v. Baird. 781 P. 2d 452, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); see 
Sd
 Myers has not cited to this Court or the district court 
to any admissible evidence, as required by Rule 56(c) of the 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, supporting his claim of 
misrepresentation. Rather, Myers relies on his own contentions. 
Because Myers' contentions are without support in the record or 
in fact, they should be disregarded by this Court. E. a. , Hall 
v. Fitzgerald, 671 P. 2d 224, 226-27 (Utah 1983); Thornock v. 
Cook, 604 P. 2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979); United Am. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Willey. 21 Utah 2d 279, 444 P. 2d 755, 758-59 (1968). 
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gtlso Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. . 740 P. 2d 262, 
264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (when ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment, the court must consider the standard of proof); Moffat 
Enters. , Inc. v. Borden. Inc. , 807 F. 2d 1169, 1178 (3d Cir. 
1987) (fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims summarily 
dismissed because claimant could not demonstrate he could 
satisfy burden of proof). 
Andalex' s alleged misrepresentation concerns intended 
future acts by Andalex, specifically, an intent to compensate 
Myers in the future. A misrepresentation of intended future 
performance is not a "presently existing fact" upon which a 
claim for fraud can be based unless the plaintiff can prove that 
the representor, at the time of the representation, did not 
intend to perform the promise and made the representation for 
the purpose of deceiving the promisee. Cerritos Trucking Co. v. 
Utah Venture No. 1. 645 P. 2d 608, 611 (Utah 1982); Berkeley 
Bank For COOPS, V. Meibos. 607 P. 2d 798, 805 (Utah 1980). 
The only evidence offered by Myers to support the 
element of intent is that Mr. Anderson, the Chief Executive 
Officer of Andalex, never disclosed the promise to Keith Smith, 
a subordinate of Mr. Anderson7 s who was also working on the 
project. Mr. Anderson's failure to tell Mr. Smith of his 
"promise" to compensate Myers is easily explained. Mr. Anderson 
never made such a promise and therefore had nothing to share 
with Mr. Smith. Even if such a promise were made, this alleged 
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"failure" does not support a claim that Mr. Anderson had formed 
an intent in his mind to commit an intentional fraud. 
For a representation to be actionable, it must have 
been made "wilfully and knowingly. " Marks v. Continental 
Casualty Co. , 19 Utah 2d 119, 427 P. 2d 387, 389 (1967). 
Mr. Anderson' s failure to communicate an alleged promise to his 
subordinate is simply not evidence of a wilful and knowing 
falsehood. This is particularly evident when viewed in the 
context of Mr. Myers' own testimony. Mr. Myers testified that 
he believed that Andalex was honest in its dealings with Myers 
and was not attempting to deceive Myers. 33 (R. 876-78. ) 
Myers presented to the district court no evidence of 
fraudulent intent to support his claim for fraud. Because Myers 
^As noted, the only basis articulated by Myers to support 
his claim of fraud is the failure of Anderson to communicate the 
alleged promise to his subordinate. Myers does not urge 
nonperformance or nondisclosure in support of his claim. Nor 
could he. The mere nonperformance of an alleged agreement will 
not support a claim of fraud because nonperformance does not 
prove that the representor did not intend to perform at the time 
of the representation. Murray v. Xerox Corp. , 811 F. 2d 118, 122 
(2d Cir. 1987); Benetton Servs. Corp. v. Benedot, Inc. , 551 So. 
2d 295, 298 (Ala. 1989); State Bank of Willev v. States, 723 
P. 2d 159, 160 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986). See Cerritos Trucking, 645 
P. 2d at 612. Nondisclosure can properly form the basis of a 
fraud claim only where there exists "a duty to speak." 
Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. Anderson. 610 P. 2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 
1980). As a matter of law, Andalex had no "duty to speak" in 
this arm' s length business transaction. !£. at 1373. See also 
Hull v. Flinders. 83 Utah 158, 27 P. 2d 56, 58 (1933) (" [I]f 
promise is made in good faith when contract is entered into 
there is no fraud though the promisor subsequently changes his 
mind and fails or refuses to perform."). 
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was unable to satisfy his burden of "clear and convincing" 
proof, the motion for summary judgment was properly granted. 
IV. THE CONTRACT CLAIMS AGAINST MPM WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED 
The contract claims against MPM were properly 
dismissed on two separate grounds. First, the broker licensing 
statutes bar the claims. Second, MPM did not have an 
obligation, expressed or implied, to assure that Andalex 
compensated Myers, 
A. The Broker Licensing Statutes Require Myers' 
Contract Claims Against MPM Be Dismissed 
The essence of Myers7 contract claim against MPM is 
that they were to assure that any sublessee, assignee or 
purchaser of the Leases, in this instance Andalex, would 
compensate Myers for his alleged services of acting as a 
"finder" in connection with the transaction. In other words, 
this is an action by Myers to recover compensation for acting as 
a " broker. " 
As previously discussed, no unlicensed person may 
bring or maintain an action in Utah for the recovery of 
compensation for services performed which are only authorized to 
be performed by a licensed broker. Supra pp. 26-32; Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-2-18(1) (1985). Furthermore, a "finder," which is how 
Myers characterizes his involvement, falls within the parameters 
of the definition of "broker" contained in section 61-2-2(7). 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-2(7) (1989); Diversified Gen. Corp. v. 
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White Barn Golf Course. Inc.. 584 P. 2d 848, 849-50 (Utah 1978) 
(a party who brings buyer and seller together is "broker" for 
purposes of statute); see supra pp. 28-31. There is also no 
question that Myers is not licensed as a broker. (R. 595. ) 
Because Myers was acting as a broker but is not licensed as one, 
he is precluded from bringing or maintaining an action to 
recover compensation for his service. Myers argues that the 
broker licensing laws are inapplicable to his claim against MPM 
because his claim is not an action to recover compensation for 
acting as a broker, but rather an action to recover damages for 
the failure of MPM to assure that Andalex agreed to compensate 
Myers. The distinction that Myers attempts to make is a 
distinction without a difference. Myers' claim against MPM is 
still an action to recover compensation for bringing MPM and 
Andalex together. Instead of seeking recovery directly from 
Andalex, the party which Myers claims contractually owes him the 
compensation, Myers is simply attempting to recover the same 
compensation in the form of damages from MPM. The pertinent 
statutory authority makes no distinction between direct 
compensation and damages. The statute simply provides that an 
unlicensed broker cannot maintain an action to recover a fee or 
compensation for acting as a broker, regardless of the party 
pursued. 34 
34
 In Realty Executives, Inc. v. Northrup, King & Co.. 
539 P. 2d 514, 517 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975), the court noted that an 
unlicensed broker could not recover damages where his action 
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Moreover, Myers admits that if his claim against MPM 
were based upon a theory of suretyship or guaranty, he may be 
precluded from maintaining the action, (Brief of Appellants at 
27. ) A surety relationship is defined generally in 72 C. J. S. 
Principal and Surety § 2 (1987) as follows: "The relationship 
of principal and surety, or suretyship, in its broadest sense, 
is the relationship occupied by a person liable . . . for the 
performance of an act by another. ..." A guaranty is defined in 
38 C.J.S. Guaranty § 1 (1943) as follows: "A guaranty is a 
collateral undertaking by one person to answer for . . . the 
performance of some . . . duty in case of the default of another 
person. ..." Myers' claim against MPM ij3 in fact based upon a 
theory of suretyship or guaranty. Myers' contention is that MPM 
agreed to assure or insist that Andalex would compensate him for 
his services. (Brief of Appellants at 26. ) The alleged 
agreement between MPM and Myers, as described by Myers, falls 
within the definitions of surety or guaranty. 35 As noted by 
Myers, it therefore should be dismissed. 
could not be established without a showing that he violated the 
law. Likewise, Myers cannot establish his claim against MPM 
without showing he violated the law by performing services 
without a proper license. 
35
 Myers' claim is basically that MPM was assuring 
Andalex's performance, similar to a performance bonds. A 
performance bond creates a suretyship. Qf. Board of County 
Supervisors v. Sie-Grav Developers, Inc. , 334 S. E. 2d 542, 546 
(Va. 1985). 
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Myers' claim is barred as a matter of law under the 
broker licensing statutes, and summary judgment was properly 
entered. 
B. MPM Had No Implied Contractual Obligation to 
Assure Myers' Compensation 
Myers' contends36 that his agreement with MPM 
contained a covenant of good faith and fair dealing which 
required MPM to assure that Andalex compensated Myers so that 
Myers would receive his "expectation."37 (Brief of Appellant 
at 28. ) 
Myers testified that his "expectation" regarding the 
compensation arrangement between the parties was accurately 
dbBefore the district court, Myers also urged that MPM had 
intentionally interfered with economic relations. This claim 
has been dropped on appeal. (Brief of Appellants at 26 n. 65. ) 
37
 The claim against MPM is based in part on the factual 
assertion that MPM had insisted that Grace compensate Myers. 
(Brief of Appellants at 8, 1F 12; 9, 1F 18; 26. ) In Myers' Brief, 
he contends that as a result of such insistence, Grace entered 
into an agreement with Myers. (Brief of Appellants at 26. ) To 
support this conclusion, Myers cites to his own Memorandum in 
Opposition to MPM' s Motion for Summary Judgment. In the 
Memorandum, Myers cites to his own answers to interrogatories. 
A citation to one' s own answers to interrogatories does not 
create an issue of fact to preclude summary judgment, unless the 
answer meets the evidentiary requirements of Rule 56(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A & M Enters. , Inc. v. Hunziker, 
25 Utah 2d 363, 482 P. 2d 700, 701-02 (1971); £f. Car Ctr. , Inc. 
v. Home Indem. Co. , 519 So. 2d 1319, 1322 (Ala. 1988). The 
answers to which Myers refers contain mere conclusions and would 
not be admissible evidence. Therefore, the answers do not 
comply with Rule 56(e). D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P. 2d 420, 
421 (Utah 1989). Accordingly, the contention should be 
disregarded. See also supra note 32. 
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reflected in the letter agreement and subsequent correspondence 
between the parties. (R. 547-52.) It is undisputed that these 
documents do not contain an express obligation for MPM to assure 
Myers' compensation. (R. 540, 545-46, 551-52. ) As a matter of 
law, a court will not imply terms to relieve a party from the 
express terms of a contract absent mutual assent. Fowler v. 
Taylor, 554 P.2d 205, 208 (Utah 1976) (quoting Rasmussen v. 
United States Steel Co. . 1 Utah 2d 291, 265 P. 2d 1002, 1004 
(1954)); Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 P. 2d 651, 654 (quoting 
Rasmus sen). 
The letters which comprise the agreement between these 
parties do not in anyway suggest or imply that MPM were 
obligated to require any such purchaser to compensate Myers. In 
fact, the intent of both parties as manifested by these writings 
is to the contrary. For example, in the May 23 letter Myers 
states: "My intent is to receive any compensation for sub-lease 
of coal from the producer of the coal." (Addendum, Ex. A. ) The 
intent of MPM on this issue was stated in the March 18, 1981 
letter as follows: 
Insofar as compensation is concerned, you 
initially established in your May 23, 1979 
letter to our group, that you would seek any 
compensation for vour efforts from the 
purchaser, and we agreed to allow you to 
present qualified purchasers on that basis. 
It is not our desire to depart from that 
position in any way with respect to your 
continued activities. 
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(Addendum, Ex. C) (emphasis added). This issue was also 
addressed in the March 24, 1981 letter from Mono to Myers, where 
Mono stated: 
It also follows that we are in agreement 
that any compensation to which you may be 
entitled for finding a buyer for Mono 
Powers' interest must be arranged with such 
buyer by you and not bv us. 
(Addendum, Ex. D) (emphasis added). Similarly, in a letter from 
Pacific to Myers dated May 5, 1980, Pacific stated: 
I would like to reiterate our agreement that 
any compensation to you for vour efforts 
will have to be worked out between you and 
interested parties other than [Malapai], 
Mono Power, and [Pacific]. 
(Addendum, Ex. B) (emphasis added). Myers testified that these 
letters accurately reflected his understanding of the agreement. 
(R. 547-52. ) 
The correspondence upon which Myers relies for his 
contract claim is clear and unambiguous on the issue of 
compensation: The parties intended and agreed that any 
compensation for Myers was to come from the purchaser and that 
Myers was obligated to make his own arrangements for 
compensation. Because there is no evidence of mutual assent to 
imply a term contrary to these express terms, Myers' claim based 
on any such implied term was properly dismissed by the district 
court. 
Even assuming there was an "agreement" between the 
parties which gives rise to an implied covenant of good faith, 
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such a covenant does not require a party to take affirmative 
action to protect the interest of the other party to the 
contract. This issue has been addressed by a series of Utah 
cases. In Ted R. Brown & Assocs. , Inc. v. Carnes Corp. , 753 
P. 2d 964 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), this Court observed: 
It is fundamental that every contract 
imposes a duty on the parties to exercise 
their contractual rights and perform their 
contractual obligations reasonably and in 
good faith. Nonetheless, a court may not 
make a better contract for the parties than 
they have made for themselves; furthermore, 
a court may not enforce asserted rights not 
supported by the contract itself. '[I]t 
cannot be adopted as a general precept of 
contract law that, whenever one party to a 
contract can show injury flowing from the 
exercise of a contract right by the other, a 
basis for relief will be somehow devised by 
the courts. ' 
Id. at 970 (citations omitted). In Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc. , 
812 P. 2d 49 (Utah 1991) the Utah Supreme Court stated with 
regard to the implied covenant of good faith: "Such a covenant 
cannot be construed, however, to establish new, independent 
rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties." Ld. at 55. 
In Rio Alaom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd. , 618 P. 2d 497 (Utah 1980) the 
supreme court emphasized that " [a] court will not enforce 
asserted rights that are not supported by the contract itself." 
Ifl. at 505. 
None of the cases cited by Myers supports his argument 
that a contracting party must take affirmative action to protect 
the other party to comply with the covenant of good faith. In 
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St. Benedict s Development Co. v. St. Benedict Hospital, 811 
P. 2d 194 (Utah 1991), cited by Myers, the defendant was accused 
of violating the covenant of good faith because it had taken 
affirmative action in contravention of express terms of the 
agreement. I&. at 198-200. This case has no application here. 
Myers' reliance on Steinmeyer v. Warner Consolidated Corp. . 116 
Cal. Rptr. 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974), is also misplaced. In that 
case, the court stated that each party has a duty "to do 
everything the contract presupposes. " Ij&. at 60 (quoting Harm 
v. Frasher, 5 Cal. Rptr. 367, 374 (Cal. Ct. App. I960)). The 
court did not express or infer that a party must take 
affirmative action outside the contract terms to protect the 
other party. 
Myers relies on Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract 
and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 Harv. L. 
Rev. 369 (1980), for his argument that in denying Myers his 
expected compensation, MPM improperly exercised discretion 
granted under the agreement in a way not contemplated by the 
parties. This argument is simply erroneous. The contemplation 
of the parties is set forth in the correspondence between them. 
Myers does not dispute this. The correspondence, as noted 
above, states that Myers is to make his own arrangements for 
compensation. Nowhere is there any suggestion in that 
correspondence that the parties contemplated that MPM would 
assure compensation to Myers. Furthermore, the article relied 
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upon by Myers states that when discretion is exercised for a 
legitimate purpose, the covenant is not violated. £&. at 384-85 
("The courts, mindful that good faith should not be used as a 
vehicle for judicial fiat, defer to a party who acts with no 
improper purpose."). Myers has presented no evidence that 
suggests that the transaction with Andalex was not a legitimate 
business transaction, or done in bad faith or for an improper 
purpose. 
If, in fact, an enforceable agreement exists between 
Myers and MPM, it is set forth in the various letters referenced 
above. At no point in his Brief does Myers attempt to challenge 
or refute the clear and unmistakable language of that 
correspondence. Those letters unambiguously provide that any 
compensation to Myers was to come from the potential purchaser 
and such compensation was to be arranged by Myers. There is 
nothing in the correspondence that even suggests that MPM had a 
duty to assure Myers1 compensation. 
Myers' argument that the covenant of good faith 
required MPM to assure Myers' compensation is taking the 
covenant to the extreme and absurd. The covenant simply does 
not require a party to forego its rights and privileges under a 
contractual arrangement to protect the other party. All that is 
required is good faith. There is no showing that MPM failed to 
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exercise good faith. The district court' s order of summary 
judgment on this issue should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Myers has presented no evidence or argument that 
justifies reversal of the trial court' s decisions below. The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Myers' 
efforts to add, in an action that had been pending for five 
years, a claim that was itself legally insufficient as a matter 
of law. Moreover, the trial court properly entered judgment in 
favor of Andalex and MPM on all claims between the parties. The 
trial court properly held that Myers' contract claims were 
barred by the real estate licensing statutes and Statute of 
Frauds and that his fraud claim failed for lack of proof. The 
trial court' s decision should be affirmed. 
DATED this 12th day of January, 1993. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
BY/7XJ^/Kstic/Z'/^fa <//^\ 
^Tohn A. Snow 
Kathryn H. Snedaker 
Attorneys for Appellees 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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Tab A 
RICHARD B. MYERS 
P. 0. BOX 301 
MADISONVILLE, KENTUCKY 42431 
May 23, 1979 
I, Richard 6. Myers, P. 0. Box 301, Madisonville, 
Kentucky 42431 will act as agent for the Resource Company 
for the sole purpose of leasing or the selling of federal 
and state leases now owned by Resource Company located in 
Kaiparowits Plateau, south central Utah. 
As previously agreed 1 will get approval from you 
before presenting this property and or leases to any mining 
firm or producer. I will attempt to sub-lease the properties 
as recommended by Mr. Nugent and would consider sale of 
leases with your consent only. My intent is to receive any 
compensation for sub-lease of coal from the producer of 
the coal. Should a sales agreement be reached with your 
consent my commission fee would be five percent on the 
first million and two percent on all over the one million 
dollars. 
Knowing that this will not be a short term project 
I would appreciate your designating a length of time to 
be allowed for me to come up with a producer. Should 1 
introduce a producer and it takes a greater time to arrange 
the deal than alloted me I would still consider myself 
the finder. 
I understand that you have the right to refuse any 
mining company or producer that is not acceptable to your 
firm. 
ACCEPTED BY: PROPOSED BY: 
<2£W& $ *
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
to 
TabB 
NEW ALBION RESOURCES CO. 
P. O. BOX 165 • SAN DIEGO, CALIF 92112 
May 5, 1980 
Mr. Richard B. Myers 
P.O. Box 301 
«*!adisonville, Kentucky 42431 
Dear Mr. Myers: 
This lettter is in response to your recent 
activities and ycur letter of February 13. Speaking 
for NARCO and our partners, we arc very impressed with 
the collective effort that you and the Xoppers Company 
personnel put into the assessment cf our Kaiparowits 
lease* as a source of coal for L Koppers methanol 
installation, l?e would be willing to look at ether 
interested parties that you present to us on a case by 
case basis until such time as we indicate otherwise. 
X would like to reiterate our agreement that 
any compensation to you for your efforts will have to 
be worked out between you and interested parties other 
than NARCO, Mono Power* and Resources Co. 2 look forward 
to meeting with you and your prospective Kaiparowits 
coal lease developers. 
mo/ James M. Nugent 
General Manager* NARCO 
cc; J. L. Wilson 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
ZJ 
TabC 
RESOURCES COMPANY 
f. O. k i 20124 • fttMftix, Anion* 15036 
March 18, 1981 
Mr. Richard B. Myers 
Myers k Company 
P.O. Box 301 
Madiaonville, KY 42431 
Dear Mr. Myers: 
This letter is written to you in order to confirm a 
telephone conference call on Monday, March 16, 1981, between 
yourself and representatives of Resources Company, New 
Albion Resources Company and Mono Power Company. The 
matters discussed in the following paragraphs represent the 
position of Resources Company only, and do not reflect the 
relative positions of New Albion or Mono. 
A copy of your December 23, 1980 letter to Ron Watkins 
has been furnished to us. Naturally, wa are somewhat 
disappointed and confused by your reluctance to execute our 
November 12, 1980 letter to you, because we do believe that 
it accurately describes the relationship between yourself 
and the Companies. 
Be that as it may, we do believe it is necessary that 
there be some clear understanding regarding the relationship 
between you and our company, both individually and as a 
member of the group with New Albion and Mono, particularly 
in light of tha statement in your December 23, 1980 letter 
to the affect that you will continue working with W.R. Grace 
& Company as long as there is a possibility of an agreement 
being reached with our group. 
Wa hava no objection to your continued efforts to 
accomplish a sala of our Kaiparowits interests to W.R. Grace 
& Company provided, however, that you recognize that 
Resources Company has never given to you - and does not now 
give to you - any exclusive right to represent us. As you 
have always been aware, we have had various discussions with 
other qualified purchasers not introduced by you and we 
intend to continue such further discussions at our option. 
These in no way will establish any rights in your favor 
should a sale be concluded with a purchaser who was not 
introduced to us by you. 
PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
Mr. Richard B. Myers 
March 18, 1981 
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Insofar as compensation is concerned, you initially 
established in your May 23, 1979 letter to our group, that 
you would seek any compensation for your efforts from the 
purchaser, and we agreed to allow you to present qualified 
purchasers on that basis. It is not our desire to depart 
from that position in any way with respect to your continued 
activities. 
Inasmuch as no sales have yet been concluded between the 
Companies, or any one of them, and a qualified purchaser 
presented by you, we do not agree that - as you state in 
your December 23 letter - your company has fulfilled the 
expectations of your May 23, 1979 letter. We intend, 
however, to abide by the terms of your May 23, 1979 letter 
in any further dealings between us. 
We do regret the confusion and delay which has sur-
rounded this matter, but we trust that you will understand 
our position and conduct your activities in recognition of 
it. 
Please indicate your acceptance of the foregoing by 
written confirmation at your earliest opportunity. 
Very truly yours, 
Bernard Gass 
Vice President 
J* 
TabD 
«. N. t U t O f N i l C K I H 
Mono Power Company 
p e t o i t o e 
1144 WALNUT GMOVC AVtNUC 
MOSCMCAO CAUFOftNIA t l ? 7 0 
March 24, 1981 
"I'V 
Mr. Richard B. Myers 
Myers & Company 
P. 0. Box 301 
Madisonville, KY 42431 
Dear Mr. Myers: 
This letter is in confirmation of the matters discussed 
in a telephone conference call held March 16, 1981, between 
you and the undersigned, for Mono Power Company, Mr. Ferguson, 
for Resources Company, and Mr. Nugent, for New Albion 
Resources Co., as well as the content of the letter repre-
senting the views of Resources Co., vhich was read to you on 
the telephone. 
While we generally concur in the position stated In 
the Resources Co. letter, we wanted to emphasize that we have 
been and are now engaged in an intensive exploration of means 
to utilize the.coal produced at Kalparowits in various projects, 
and necessarily must stay flexible in our dealing with any 
potential buyers. Consequently, no negotiation with any person 
in vhich we participated ever contemplated a firm, non-exclusive 
commitment to any potential buyer or sublessee, and, as you 
are aware, there were a number of negotiations with others 
going on at the same time. This must continue to be the case. 
It also follows that we are in agreement that any 
compensation to vhich you might be entitled for finding a buyer 
for Mono Power's interest must be arranged with such buyer by 
you and not by us. 
Ve share the regret of the other participants in the 
Kalparowits project that there has been a misunderstanding re-
garding your representation and the focus of your activities, 
but ve believe that such misunderstanding can be avoided in 
the future by being sure that the vievs and objectives of each 
of the participants are clear to you. 
Very truly yours. 
*4*£C4/L 
bcc: W. H. Seaman 
C. B. McCarthy 
R. J. Cahall 
PLAINTIFFS 
EXHIBIT 
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